This blog post examines how Firevent’s anarchistic epistemology influences the freedom and diversity of modern scientific inquiry.
According to Feyerabend’s anarchistic epistemology, scientists must be completely free to explore. This is because existing methodologies provide overly simplistic rules compared to human talent and its potential for expression, which can suppress uniquely human ways of thinking. In other words, he believed that the more rules are refined, the greater the risk of excluding the diverse ways humans think and the complex conditions of reality. This idea is starkly evident in his statement, “Anything goes.” Therefore, Feyerabend argues that since no two theories can be logically ranked in superiority, science itself cannot be considered superior to other forms of knowledge, such as astrology or magic.
Alan Chalmers, author of ‘What is this thing called Science’, criticizes Feyerabend’s argument. He contends that no one, including scientists, is granted the opportunity to explore ‘completely freely’, and that such freedom does not actually exist. Scientists conduct their research under practical constraints such as experimental conditions, the abilities of their assistants, and salary, meaning complete freedom from all constraints is impossible. Furthermore, he criticizes astrology and magic, arguing they cannot be freely chosen on equal footing with science because they do not address the major problems of modern society. The author, however, criticizes Alan Chalmers’ argument and seeks to lend weight to Feyerabend’s anarchistic epistemology.
The author agrees with Chalmers’ criticism that “there can be no inquiry under absolute freedom.” Realistic constraints inevitably exist. However, this fact should not weaken the scientist’s will to pursue inquiry “completely freely” or become an obstacle limiting the direction of inquiry to conform only to existing knowledge systems. What may be constrained by conditions such as experimental environment and capital is merely a part of free scientific inquiry.
The Copenhagen interpretation, which first introduced uncertainty into physics and posited that the act of observation itself probabilistically determines scientific facts, faced criticism from many established scientists, including Schrödinger, at the time. Yet this theory became a crucial foundation of modern quantum mechanics. It resulted from free thinking that broke away from the classical physics paradigm of establishing theories based on observing phenomena. Another example is string theory. This theory posits that the matter composing the world exists not as existing zero-dimensional particles, but as one-dimensional strings. Although the precise functioning of this theory remains unproven and thus unverified, it has succeeded in offering new interpretations for phenomena unexplained by existing knowledge, such as predicting the existence of gravitons. Even now, despite its uncertain prospects, string theory remains an active field of research. These studies are not based on induction through repeated observation and do not contain physically observable facts, making them potentially unverifiable. However, by guaranteeing methodological freedom in scientific inquiry and respecting diversity, the body of scientific knowledge can become more robust through greater challenges and innovation. Although it is impossible to logically refute Chalmers’ claim that ‘completely free’ scientific inquiry is unattainable, the freedom of scientific inquiry infringed upon by practical constraints is only partial. Much of it can be overcome through diverse methodologies, making a pessimistic stance open to criticism.
Chalmers’ claim that astrology or magic cannot be chosen on equal footing with science due to a lack of urgency—that is, because they do not address major problems of modern society—is also open to criticism. It is unclear whether a knowledge system occupies an inferior position relative to science because it did not address major problems of modern society, or whether it was eliminated by science—which became the mainstream knowledge system—and thus failed to accumulate knowledge about these problems. Regardless of a knowledge system’s completeness, if it is shunned by society and the public, it is unlikely to develop in a direction addressing the major problems of modern society that capture public attention. Knowledge systems develop through discussion, and discussion arises from necessity.
What about religions with a sense of urgency? Each religion asserts different claims, follows different gods, and has different scriptures explaining the workings of the world. Nevertheless, many religious people living on the same planet believe in their respective gods, feel a deep need for them, and gain truth and determine their behavior according to their teachings. So, can religion stand on equal footing with science because of its sense of urgency? What about the astrology or magic preached by the followers of that religion?
According to Chalmers’ critique, all legitimate knowledge systems must possess urgency, and thus modern people must feel the necessity of that knowledge system. However, such an argument risks the error of placing numerous non-scientific systems, which modern people feel are necessary, on the same level as science. Can the fact that modern people feel a necessity for a system serve as evidence that it is suitable to become the methodology constituting science? We cannot answer yes. Therefore, Chomsky’s criticism based on the lack of urgency in other knowledge systems is invalid.
Thus far, we have counter-criticized Chomsky’s two criticisms of Feyerabend’s anarchistic epistemology—namely, the unreality of a methodology free from all constraints and the lack of urgency in non-scientific knowledge systems—and have lent weight to Feyerabend’s epistemology. While agreeing that freedom from all constraints is impossible, I emphasized that the need to pursue a free methodology and knowledge establishment system that respects the individual scientist’s thought system still exists. Furthermore, I argued that the lack of urgency in addressing major problems of modern society is insufficient to logically determine the superiority of a methodology.
Of course, the author is not suggesting that astrology, magic, or religion should be placed on the same level as science. A pessimistic attitude that doubts the development of scientific research methodology and denies the very criteria distinguishing science from non-science is highly dangerous, as it could cause significant social chaos.
According to British science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke, sufficiently advanced science is indistinguishable from magic. Indeed, as science becomes increasingly sophisticated, the individual domains of understanding for each scientist within the entirety of human scientific achievement are shrinking. Inevitably, the boundary between pre-science and normal science will gradually blur. Theories like quantum mechanics and string theory, which transcend existing methodologies, are gaining attention. Therefore, future philosophy of science must adopt the diversity of Feyerabend’s anarchistic epistemology and establish a more multifaceted knowledge-building system.