This blog post examines why Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of language changes according to context and rules, and explores the concept of language games presented in his later philosophy.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be divided into an early and a late period. The early period is represented by the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, while the late period is represented by the Philosophical Investigations. He saw philosophical problems as arising from ambiguous language use and sought to resolve them by analyzing and criticizing language to clarify it. Consequently, his philosophical thought is centered on language.
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein maintained the position that language is a mirror that accurately reflects the world. In this work, he explained the role of language through the picture theory, which states that language reflects the state of the world and that the structure of language must correspond to the structure of the world. This position reflects his early philosophical belief that language possesses objective and fixed meaning.
However, in his later work, he criticized his own early philosophy and attempted a new approach. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein develops arguments different from his earlier work, based on a critical stance toward the picture theory he had advocated in the Tractatus. The picture theory viewed the words of language as designations for objects, and sentences as combinations of these designations. That is, the meaning of a word was seen as determined by the object it referred to. However, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein argued, contrary to the picture theory, that the meaning of a word lies in its use. He put forward a new claim: the meaning of a word is not fixed, but is grasped according to the context and rules in which the word is used.
This argument highlights that words in language can perform diverse functions; according to him, such diversity is not fixed but fluid. Therefore, the meaning of language can manifest differently depending on the situation and context, meaning language cannot be explained by a fixed logical structure. This shift represents a crucial turning point in how Wittgenstein understood the relationship between language and the world.
Regarding the meaning of words, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of family resemblance. Family resemblance is a concept applied to language from the resemblance among family members, signifying a complex web of overlapping and intersecting similarities. For example, the word ‘play’ can refer to various objects like card games, hide-and-seek, word chain games, soccer, and baseball. There is no single property common to all of them; only partially overlapping and intersecting properties exist. If a common property were found in all the objects the word “play” can refer to, it would become a fixed meaning representing the essence of play. But no such essence exists; there are only relations connecting the parts in countless different ways. Therefore, the word “play” is not used with one essential meaning, but with various meanings depending on context and rules.
Wittgenstein devised the concept of language games by comparing language to play; it signifies the totality composed of language and the actions intertwined with it. He devised this concept to emphasize that speaking language is part of an activity and is based on the form of life. Language is not merely a system of signs or symbols; it gains meaning through its actual use within a social context. This underscores that language does not possess fixed meanings in and of itself, but rather acquires meaning through interactions between people.
According to him, language games can disappear or emerge anew; they vary in type and function. While different language games do not share a common essence, they form family resemblances and are composed of language and the actions associated with that language. For example, when someone says “hammer!” at a construction site, the word “hammer” is not merely used to designate the physical hammer lying there, but with the purpose of requesting someone to hand it over. He states that if one only knows that ‘hammer’ simply designates the object “hammer” in this situation, they cannot participate in the language game unfolding within the context of that construction site. Language games are only possible when one knows the context and rules and acts accordingly.
Wittgenstein contends that the rules of language are based on the form of life, which can be described as the way or manner in which the people using that language live. Therefore, it is public. He believes that if one does not engage in any activity following the rules within a language game, it cannot be called language. He defines language without rules as private language.
According to him, private language, lacking rules, is incomprehensible to others and even to oneself, making language games impossible. Wittgenstein sees the agreement in the life-forms of language users as the prerequisite for language rules to function. This means that for language to be a tool of communication, it requires not only agreement in definitions but also agreement in judgments. Agreement on definitions refers to agreement on the definitions of words, while agreement in judgment refers to agreement in the way words are applied, and ultimately, agreement in the way one reacts to and perceives something. For example, for ‘red’ to be a tool for communication, one must know its definition, that definition must be mutually agreed upon, and the reactions elicited by using ‘red’ must also be consistent.
If people say “red” about the color of an object but their reactions do not match, the word “red” cannot function as a tool for communication. Agreement in the form of life implies agreement in definition and judgment. That is, agreement in language use signifies sharing the same form of life.
The fact that the agreement of life forms is a prerequisite for the operability of language rules implies that private language cannot exist. Private language is the language of an egocentric world that takes my consciousness as its starting point. The domain where language rules can operate is not the egocentric world of my consciousness, but the community that includes you, me, and others—that is, our lifeworld. This suggests the fictitious nature of philosophical materials that take my consciousness as their starting point, which, from Wittgenstein’s standpoint, implies the possibility of private language. His later philosophy emphasizes that community and interaction are crucial foundations for philosophical thought in this regard, opening a path to understand philosophical problems in new ways. This underscores that philosophy must move beyond the analysis of abstract concepts and instead explore meaning within the actual use of language and real life.
