This blog post delves beyond the instinctive aversion and ethical debates surrounding human cloning to explore the balance between scientific feasibility and societal acceptance.
In February 1997, the Roslin Institute in the UK announced news that would astonish the world: the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep. Dolly, the world’s first mammal born through somatic cell cloning, caused a tremendous stir. U.S. President Clinton directed the National Bioethics Advisory Committee (NBAC) to investigate the issue. In June of the same year, following its investigation, the NBAC recommended to the President that legislation be enacted to ban human cloning as a federal crime. Based on this, President Clinton submitted a bill to Congress banning human cloning for five years. The European Parliament also urged European Union (EU) member states to ban all research related to human cloning.
World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Hiroshi Nakajima similarly stated, “The WHO considers the birth of a human being through cloning technology to be ethically unacceptable, as it violates the fundamental principle of physician-assisted childbirth. This fundamental principle includes respect for human dignity and the safeguarding of genetic material.“ Following this line, the WHO also resolved that ”the use of cloning technology for the purpose of replicating a specific human being is contrary to humanity and morality and is ethically unacceptable.” This consistent negative reaction to human cloning from individuals and groups seemed almost instinctive. So, is this aversion truly valid and rational? A more logical approach, rather than an instinctive one, is needed.
Before delving into the discussion, we must first define and clarify the scope of human cloning. Cloning encompasses several major forms, including molecular cloning, cytoplasmic cloning, embryonic cloning, and somatic cell nuclear transfer (somatic cell cloning). Among these, embryonic cloning and somatic cell nuclear transfer are the ones we must focus on. Embryo cloning involves replicating an embryo already formed through sexual reproduction to create a genetically identical embryo, essentially creating identical twins artificially. Somatic cell nuclear transfer, which involves transplanting the nucleus of an adult somatic cell into an enucleated egg, is considered more serious than embryo cloning. While there is debate over whether an embryo constitutes a stage of life, somatic cell cloning is possible even with adult organisms, which are clearly living beings. This means it is possible to create new life by cloning a living adult organism. Dolly was also born through this method.
In fact, various forms of cloned organisms existed even before Dolly. Since Spemann’s successful cloning of a newt in Switzerland in 1902, cloning has been achieved in various animals including frogs, mice, sheep, and rabbits. However, all these cases involved embryonic cloning. Dolly received particular attention because she was the first mammal born through somatic cell cloning, not embryonic cloning. This was sufficient to generate anxiety about the possibility of human somatic cell cloning.
So why do people feel repulsed by human cloning? The most immediately apparent reasons are moral sensibilities, instinctive reactions, and disgust. While expressed differently, these are fundamentally similar. Mary Warnock stated, “Wherever ethics exist, whether private or public, there is a barrier that should not be crossed regardless of the outcome, and crossing it provokes a strong sense of repulsion.” Leon R. Kass also described the revulsion toward human cloning as “something we know and feel immediately, without argument,” “something contrary to what is familiar and right,” “an aversion to excessive human artifice,” and “a warning against trespassing into things unspeakably profound.”
Their argument is that we should listen to what people instinctively reject before logically determining right and wrong. However, this thinking contains a flaw. Certainly, people’s instinctive aversion can appear to have rational grounds. For example, the instinctive aversion to murder and rape is clearly considered right, and many people agree without needing logical justification.
But this is not always the case. Just a few decades ago, hatred toward Black people was taken for granted in white society, stemming more from instinctive revulsion than from logic or reason. While some people may still harbor such feelings internally today, their numbers have diminished, and such hatred is now clearly recognized as wrong. Instinctive revulsion changes with the times and cannot always be considered right.
The same applies to human cloning. An instinctive aversion to human cloning is insufficient grounds to ban it. We cannot assert that the instinctive aversion people currently feel toward human cloning is always correct. Just as hatred toward Black people has diminished in white societies, aversion to human cloning may also decrease over time. Furthermore, there is no inherent necessity for such instinctive aversion to become a social norm in the form of prohibition. Rather than relying on vague aversion that can change over time and cannot be definitively deemed correct, a more logical approach is needed.
Beyond instinctive aversion, logical objections exist. The renowned molecular biologist Axel Kahn argues that “human cloning solely for the purpose of obtaining extra cell lines violates Kant’s principle of human dignity from a philosophical perspective.” Kant’s principle means “human beings must not be treated merely as means for the sake of human dignity.” But where exactly does the line lie for treating humans as mere means?
For example, when an infertile couple seeks to have a child by replicating their own genes, is this ‘treating the child as a mere means’? It is common to see parents having children to leave descendants, to give their child siblings, or to have a son. Is this fundamentally different from human cloning? Kant’s logic is suitable for criticizing slavery or Nazi atrocities, but it is difficult to apply clearly to these cases.
Furthermore, the European Parliament resolution prohibits human cloning, stating that ‘every individual has the right to maintain their genetic uniqueness.’ However, the concept of genetic uniqueness barely existed before the issue of human cloning arose. There are no cases of identical twins claiming their genetic uniqueness has been violated. Ultimately, isn’t the concept of genetic uniqueness born from a vague fear of human cloning?
This issue can be sufficiently prevented even while allowing human cloning. Naturally, the consent of the individual being cloned would be required for such cloning to occur. If human cloning is legalized and all procedures, starting with the consent of the subject individual, are systematically legislated and monitored, it is possible to prevent the birth of one’s own clone without their knowledge.
Everyone feels some degree of fear towards new things. Fear and concern about human cloning are not particularly strange or wrong. However, restricting the freedom of science and human freedom based on vague fears is undesirable. Furthermore, many opposing arguments contain exaggerated or overly simplistic aspects. While weak opposition grounds do not automatically make the arguments for approval sufficient, rather than leaning toward prohibiting human cloning based on vague fears or logically deficient opposition, viewing it as a potential direction for human development and advancing it could open a healthier and more progressive future for life sciences.
