In this blog post, we explore the impact of human cloning technology on bioethics and identity, and ponder whether it is truly a beneficial choice for humanity.
Since the birth of the cloned sheep Dolly, the debate over applying genetic cloning technology to humans has persisted for a long time. Among those holding a positive view on human cloning is John Harris. He presented his opinion in his book ‘The Gene Revolution and Bioethics’. The development of biotechnology is progressing at such a groundbreaking and rapid pace that it has earned the name ‘gene revolution’. Harris advocates for human cloning through this gene revolution and criticizes opponents of human cloning who raise concerns about human rights and ethics. While I can acknowledge John Harris’s philosophical perspective on cloning from the standpoint of freedom to some extent, I cannot accept most of the arguments and justifications supporting human cloning. I wish to refute the issues he overlooks and challenge his reasoning. I will reconstruct the opinions of leading scholars in genetics, philosophy, law, and medicine—such as Hillary Putnam, Ruth Ditch, and Alan Coleman—who oppose human cloning, to articulate why human cloning should not be attempted.
John Harris holds a critical view of the public opinion of human cloning opponents and the resolution on cloning adopted by the European Parliament. The European Parliament stated that human cloning cannot be justified under any circumstances. To summarize the rationale: ‘Human cloning implicitly allows for racial selection, thereby violating human equality. Furthermore, it requires experimentation on humans, potentially infringing upon and undermining human dignity.’ This largely aligns with the public opinion opposing human cloning. However, Harris criticizes opponents’ arguments for mostly lacking proper reasoning and justification, relying only on vague references to human rights and fundamental principles without providing concrete examples of how these rights and principles are violated. In short, he argues they make superficially appealing, universally correct-sounding claims without any actual cases. Harris argues that there are no examples of principles like respect for human dignity or the safety of genetic material being violated. However, I disagree. It is important to recognize that the reason Harris claims there are no cases of human dignity or genetic material safety being violated by human cloning is precisely because human cloning experiments have not yet actually been conducted.
Why have proponents and opponents of human cloning been divided and their opinions clashed since the moment the cloned sheep Dolly was successfully replicated? Given the uncertainty surrounding the feasibility and success rate of human cloning, humanity cannot know whether it is morally right or acceptable to proceed before attempting it. This is why people are expressing their differing views. If human cloning were to proceed in its current state, the outcome of such experiments would become the first instance where Harris’s desired human rights and fundamental principles are violated.
Harris stated that most arguments against human cloning lack adequate reasoning and justification. He adopts an attitude of not understanding how human rights are violated or what detrimental effects it has on perceptions of human dignity. He believes that with sufficient advancement in biotechnology and a shift in public perception, there is no reason human cloning should be socially rejected. However, I do not believe so many arguments and reasons are necessary to create new life. If there is even the slightest possibility of harm to the newly created life, that alone can be sufficient reason. Furthermore, if the act of creating new life carries the potential to cause additional harm to others and generate socially detrimental currents and public opinion, that too can be sufficient reason for opposition. Human cloning applies to both of these aspects. A child born through human cloning can never be safer than one born through normal reproductive activity. According to Alan Coleman, in the case of the cloned sheep Dolly, over 430 cell fusion attempts were made, resulting in 277 reconstituted embryos. Only 29 of these survived to the stage of being implanted into the sheep’s uterus, and only one of those resulted in a successful birth. Moreover, the cloned sheep Dolly did not live as long as a normal sheep. This indicates an extremely low success rate for cloning, meaning that in human cloning, many embryos would inevitably be discarded. The physical and psychological suffering of surrogate mothers cannot be ignored either. Furthermore, cloned humans born through human cloning have a higher probability of developing cancer as they age and a higher risk of suffering from progeria, a condition causing accelerated aging. While one might believe human cloning is 100% safe based on sufficient animal testing and proceed with it, the results are unknown because humans and other animals differ significantly in reproductive physiology and embryology. Considering the deformed child (or even a seemingly normal one) born as a product of the cloning process, it is clear that this is universally wrong when one thinks about the difficult life that child would endure, the kind of community they would live in, how their identity would form, and the worries about unspecified genetic diseases that could arise later. Crucially, if this phenomenon occurs, it is sadly likely that the birth of a cloned human would remain unknown to the public for several years. This is because it would inevitably face public condemnation. Proponents might argue that new medical advances inherently carry potential risks, and prioritizing safety alone would prevent any progress. This is undoubtedly why animal testing is also carried out. However, what we must consider beforehand is the ratio of risk to the resulting public benefit. Many argue that natural science should not be developed solely for its instrumental value. They contend that scientific and technological progress must be promoted regardless of its perceived usefulness. Yet the issue of cloned humans is inherently sensitive, as it involves life itself. Consider the successful scenario where a cloned human is born, survives, and lives like an ordinary person. Even then, I question whether the benefits gained—such as cloned humans serving as organ transplant donors, providing blood without rejection, or the birth of children exhibiting desired traits—are truly important and necessary enough to justify undertaking the immense risks and immorality I mentioned earlier.
Social problems are also inevitable. Our society is not yet ready to accept cloned humans as no different from ordinary humans. This means that even if a cloned human were to be successfully born, it would struggle to integrate seamlessly into our society. The meaning of family that humanity currently considers desirable clearly illustrates this. Diversity is a value we willingly embrace and acknowledge. From a couple’s perspective, the unpredictability and excitement of not knowing what kind of child will be born, along with that child’s diversity, is an essential value for humanity to form and live within family societies. However, when comparing a family composed of cloned humans to the family model we currently consider desirable, it’s not difficult to predict how the public might react. Outwardly, they might say it’s acceptable, but inwardly, they could harbor doubts like, ‘Is that really a true family?’ Reflecting this social sentiment, some countries have enacted laws concerning cloned humans. For example, the UK legally prohibits raising embryos or children created through nuclear transfer technology.
Harris emphasizes reproductive autonomy, arguing that banning reproductive cloning itself suppresses individual freedom regarding reproduction. However, I question whether reproductive autonomy can justify government non-interference in human cloning, or whether it is a right worth guaranteeing at the cost of public disapproval and scientific risks. If Harris’s argument were correct, acts like incest, bestiality, and adultery should not have been considered social problems in the past. Yet, these acts are illegal in most countries. This suggests why Harris’s argument faces significant societal resistance.
Harris also raises questions about whether human cloning is unethical and violates human rights and dignity, citing eight scenarios. These include infertile couples or single individuals who lost a spouse wanting children carrying their genes, and couples at high risk of genetic diseases seeking healthy children through cloning. The cases Harris presents largely concern individual freedom and desire. However, I question whether this freedom can justify the biological risks and negative social impacts that human cloning would cause, or the selfish desire to pass on one’s genes to offspring despite the existence of adoption as an alternative. I believe individual freedom can be restricted if it significantly harms the public interest or is likely to cause harm to others.
Finally, regarding the proposal to clone embryos with specific genes to treat serious diseases like AIDS, I question whether this can serve as an appropriate example in the context of opposing human cloning.
Thus far, I have refuted John Harris’s arguments advocating for human cloning, incorporating some perspectives from anti-cloning scholars Hillary Putnam, Ruth Ditch, and Alan Coleman. Hillary Putnam’s presentation of a socially desirable family model, Ruth Ditch’s analysis of human cloning from the perspectives of public perception and practicality, and Alan Coleman’s highlighting of the risks of cloning from a scientific standpoint have helped me consolidate my opposition to human cloning. While modern society respects individual freedom, it is now necessary to extend this individuality into the concept of social responsibility. In this regard, cloned humans demand an ethical burden and responsibility too great to be borne solely by individual freedom. Considering social responsibility, the human rights of the child to be born, and public reaction, I believe our society is not yet prepared for human cloning. As the saying goes, “Haste makes waste.” Forcing premature challenges risks creating social repercussions too severe to manage. Human cloning is not only premature but also an area that must not violate the dignity of human life.
